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Institutional Reform in Eastern Europe: 
Evolution or Design? 
Roman Frydman and Andrzej Rapaczynski* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Most recent studies of privatization in Eastern Europe 
focus on its impact on individual enterprises.' In our previous 
work, we examined this issue from the viewpoint of the future 
corporate governance structure in Eastern E ~ r o p e . ~  The aggre- 
gate effects of privatization have been largely neglected, per- 
haps on the assumption that they have no particular bearing 
on how privatization is to be effected at the enterprise level. It 
is very important, however, to link the discussion of the various 
approaches to large-scale privatization with a consideration of 
other obstacles in the transition to a market economy. These 
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1. See OLMER BLANCHARD ET AL., REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE (1991); hena 
Grosfeld, Privatization of State Enterprises in Eastern Europe: The Search for a 
Market Environment, 6 E. EUR. POL. & SOCIETIES 142 (1991); David Lipton & 
Jeffrey Sachs, Privatization in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland, in BROOKINGS 
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVll"Y 293 (William C. Brainard & George L. Perry, eds., 
1990); Irena Grosfeld & Paul Hare, Privatization in Hungary, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia (Mar. 1991) (mimeo). 
2. See Roman Frydman & Andrzej Rapaczynski, Markets and Institutions in 
Large-Scale Privatizations. An Approach to Economic and Social !fransformations in 
Eastern Europe, in REFORMING CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMIES: 
INTTTIAc RESULTS AND CHALLENGES (Vittorio Corbo & Fabrizio Coricelli eds., The 
World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1991); Roman Frydman & Andrzej Rapaczynski, 
Privatization and Corporate Governance in Eastern Europe; Can a Market Economy 
Be Designed?, in CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: ROADS TO GROWTH (Georg 
Winckler ed., International Monetary Fund and Austrian Natiocal Bank, 
Washington, D.C., 1992). 
2 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992 
obstacles, which include the weakness of existing capital stock, 
the absence of a banking system and the absence of capital 
markets, can be overcome through the use of a combination of 
design and reliance on market mechanisms. This combination 
can provide a successful transition to a market economy. 
As a natural reaction to the dismal failure of planning in 
Eastern Europe, there is a tendency among both Eastern Euro- 
pean and Western commentators to disparage reform proposals 
involving significant s tate  activism. Instead, these 
commentators favor solutions which rely on the spontaneity of 
economic developments. If the criticized reform proposals 
advocated long-term state involvement in the economic life of 
the region, the commentators' skepticism would be fully jus- 
tified. However, this skepti&sm may be stifling to the extent i t  
discourages reformers from making significant choices 
concerning the forces that will fill the vacuum created by the 
state's withdrawal from the management of the post- 
Communist economies. Paradoxically, Eastern Europe cannot 
rely solely on market forces to initiate the transition to a 
spontaneously fundioning market economy. Indeed, the only 
force powerful enough to set the market forces in motion is the 
very state that is supposed to remove itself from the picture. 
Thus, what passes for spontaneity may ofien amount to a 
simple entrenchment of the status quo. 
The East European economies are not virgin territory, 
where capitalism could evolve gradually. On the contrary, 
Eastern Europe has a very specific industrial infrastructure, a 
product of the command economy. In Eastern Europe, typical 
enterprises are extremely large3 and have developed links that 
will be costly to sever. Thus, a mere withdrawal of the state 
would leave intact the established special interest groups. 
These include the old management chosen for its loyalty rather 
than its competence, a labor force intent on resisting any 
changes that may endanger its job security, and a network of 
monopolies. All of these groups stand to lose from the 
institution of a truly competitive market. What is needed is 
genuine reform: that is, a design which establishes a new 
3. For example, in Poland 100 enterprises are responsible for 40% of in- 
dustrial production. 
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system of property rights and, above all, a new institutional 
arrangement of control and supervision over the performance of 
managers and labor. Design is thus necessary to overcome the 
inertia of the ancien r4g im and to initiate a process of 
restructuring and change. 
Choosing an appropriate design for each of the Eastern 
European countries is a complex task, especially when one 
considers the various institutions of capitalism. These capitalist 
institutions include corporations, banks, institutional investors, 
and stock exchanges. Thus, one can say that there is not one, 
but many market economies. Each has its own peculiar mode of 
operation, financing, and complex institutional interrelation- 
ships, which shape how managers respond to signals conveyed 
by the market. In some countries, such as Germany and Japan, 
corporate governance includes a significant role for banks and 
other financial institutions; other countries, such as Britain 
and the United States, rely on the stock market to discipline 
corporate managers. However, in both systems the institutions 
of control have evolved slowly, and the resulting economic order 
is exceedingly complex." 
With regard to privatization, Eastern Europe's most 
signdicant challenge is to make diffcult choices concerning the 
direction of institutional development and to set in motion the 
forces which can fill the gap leR by the state's withdrawal. 
However, it is important to note that the reformers operate 
under a tremendous handi~ap.~ Not only do they face an 
extremely uncertain future, which makes all planning risky, 
but they also lack solid information about the existing state of 
affairs. Thus, they run the risk of unintentionally exposing 
4. For comparisons among the different corporate governance systems, see 
Julian F'ranks & Colin Mayer, Capital Markets and Corporate Control: A Study of 
France, Germany and the UK, 5 ECON. POL'Y 191-231 (1990). For a discussion of 
the German system and its history, see ANDREW SHONF~LD, MODERN CAPITALISM 
239 (1965); Josef Esser, Bank Power in West Germany Revised, W .  EUR. POL., Oct. 
1990, at 17; and Jiirgen Kocka, The Rise of Moden Industrial Enterprise in Ger- 
many, in MANAGE= HIERARCHIES 77-116 (Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. & Herman 
Daems eds., 1980). For Japan, see THE ANATOMY OF JAPANESE BUSINESS (Kazuo 
Sato & Yasuo Hoshimo eds., 1984); RAYMOND W. GOLDSMITH, THE FINANCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN, 1868-1977 (1983); JOHANNES HIRSCHMEIER & TSUNEW(0 
Yw, THE DEVELOPMENT OF JAPANESE BUSINESS 1600-1980 (2d ed. 1981). 
5. In our view, this is a crucial aspect of the transition. 
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weak spots of the existing system to reform shocks which they 
may not be capable of absorbing. The only way to proceed, 
therefore, is to combine the element of design with a reliance 
on an array of market mechanisms that will correct the inev- 
itable flaws in the design. 
In order to successfdly combine market mechanisms and 
policy intervention, the design must have two basic formal 
features. First, it must reduce the unacceptably high level of 
uncertainty regarding the current situation. To do this the 
design must reveal as much information as possible in the 
early stages of the reform process. Policy makers can then use 
this information to refine and modify the design and avoid 
commitments which may have serious unforeseen 
consequences. Second, the design must contain self-corrective 
mechanisms that will spontaneously adjust the reform system. 
These self-corrective mechanisms are necessary since it is 
impossible to foresee all of the potential problems. These two 
formal features distinguish all successful institutional 
innovations from conventional planning schemes and should 
represent a general principle of institutional reform. 
IV. A GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR MASS 
PRIVATIZATION PROPOSALS 
The discussion in this section focuses on the most 
important Eastern European privatization schemes, namely, 
those which propose to transfer the beneficial ownership of a 
large portion of state enterprises to the general population (or a 
large fraction of it), while concentrating control functions in a 
small number of intermediary  institution^.^ 
In most privatization proposals of this kind,? the 
intermediary institutions function as holding companies or 
mutual funds, although some plans foresee a role for pension 
funds and other institutional investors. The intermediaries 
usually contain an essential foreign component. Foreign 
6.  Schemes of this kind are now being prepared in Poland and Czechoslovakia. 
Given the slow progress of conventional privatizations in Hungary, it may be only 
a matter of time before related solutions are developed there as well. 
7. For an example of such a plan, see Roman F'rydman & Andrzej 
Rapaczynski, Privatization in Poland: A New Proposal (June 1990) (mimeo). For a 
revised version of this paper published in Polish, see Roman Frydman & Andrzej 
Rapaczynski, Splywatyzowac Prywatyzacje: Nowa hpozyc ja  Ptzemian 
Wkmwsciowych w Polsce, Res publica (Sept., 1990). For other proposals, see 
BLANCHARD ET AL., supra note 1. 
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financial institutions commonly obtain management contracts 
for the newly created funds. These proposals usually envisage 
the conversion of state enterprises into joint-stock companies, 
with the intermediaries becoming legal owners of a large 
portion of their shares (some plans reserve a block of shares of 
the privatized enterprises for the state or distribute a portion 
of the shares directly to the population). The shares of the 
intermediaries themselves are in turn owned by individuals 
who acquire them free of charge or for a nominal fee. 
The use of vouchers is often contemplated for this purpose. 
Individuals can use vouchers to purchase shares of the inter- 
mediary which they would like to own or t o  allow the 
intermediaries t o  purchase shares of specific privatized 
companies for their portfolio. Thus, vouchers allow individuals 
and intermediaries to determine their own ownership interests. 
The advantages of these types of privatization proposals 
(although there are significant differences among them) include 
the following: the speed with which they can be implemented, 
the avoidance or lessening of problems associated with the 
valuation of the enterprises, the legitimization of the pri- 
vatization scheme through a distribution of the national wealth 
among the population, thus ensuring a degree of equality, and, 
above all, a facilitation of the restructuring process through the 
institution of an effective mechanism for control of 
management performance. Other advantages include the 
possibility of a rapid development of a financial infrastructure 
and a link to  outside sources of capital and expertise. 
Despite the numerous advantages inherent in these types 
of privatization proposals, significant economic and political 
obstacles must be addressed. The following section analyzes 
these potential obstacles and recommends possible solutions. 
V. OBSTACLES IN THE TRANSITION TO A MARKET 
ECONOMY 
The transition to a market economy faces a number of 
serious obstacles. A large portion of the existing capital stock in 
the Eastern European economies may turn out to be nonviable 
in a competitive market environment. Moreover, and perhaps 
more importantly, the governments of the Eastern European 
countries lack reliable information regarding the state of the 
capital stock. This makes effective policy planning extremely 
difficult and poses the realistic threat of an avalanche of 
bankruptcies. These problems may be compounded by extensive 
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interfirm links which have been developed in the command 
economy. 
In addition to practical problems, the transition to a 
market economy also presents serious political problems. The 
reformers must balance an acute need for investment capital 
and a t  the same time avoid relying extensively on foreign 
capital or ownership. Thus, the new economy must not only 
satisfy economic imperatives, but must also avoid destabilizing 
the fledgling political systems of the new Eastern Europe. 
A. The Allocation of Capital Stock: The Lack 
of Information and the Speed of Privatization 
The various mass privatization proposals envisage different 
methods for distributing the shares of the privatized enterpris- 
es to the intermediary institutions. Some proposals advocate a 
mechanical or administrative allocation. This would be accom- 
plished either by giving each intermediary an equal number of 
shares in each company to be privatized, or by dividing all of 
the companies into several groups of "roughly equal valuen8 
and allocating each group (perhaps a t  random) to one fund. 
Other proposals envisage a specially designed auction as an 
allocative mechanism, with the intermediaries bidding for the 
shares of the privatized companies using vouchers or invest- 
ment points. 
1. The lack of information 
In evaluating the relative merits of the alternative meth- 
ods of allocation, sufficient consideration must be given to the 
nature of the capital stock of the post-Communist economies. 
This is because the perverse evolution of the planned economy 
precluded the weeding out of nonviable enterprises and contrib- 
uted to the creation of enterprises that had no ratio essendi. 
The natural temptation of Eastern European policymakers 
(and, surprisingly enough, many Western analysts as well) is to 
try to ensure that the state does not find itself bereR of all 
valuable enterprises, left only with the worthless scrap of the 
8. We put this phrase in quotation marks because we believe that the task of 
assigning even rough values to state enterprises before privatization is truly 
Herculean (or perhaps rather Sisyphean). The idea that anyone would be able to 
assign values to several hundred companies within a span of a few months ap- 
pears to us entirely unrealistic. 
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Communist inheritance. A mechanical or administrative alloca- 
tion of shares among the intermediaries would prevent this by 
forcing the intermediaries to accept the weakest enterprises 
along with the strongest. The effect of this tempting move, 
however, may turn out to be unexpectedly harmful. 
Since a large part of the country's capital stock may be 
nonviable, rapidly exposing a large number of enterprises to  
the rigors of a hard budget constraint and a truly competitive 
environment may result in a spate of bankruptcies, leading to a 
swift fall in production and a rapid rise in unemployment. This, 
in turn, may destabilize the political situation and endanger 
the whole reform process. Therefore, one of the main problems 
with the schemes of rapid privatization is that, not knowing 
the real state of the capital stock, it is impossible for the gov- 
ernment t o  predict whether moving into a market economy will 
produce this devastating avalanche effect. 
Suppose, then, that using an administrative or mechanical 
allocation scheme, the government forces the intermediaries to 
take an unknown number of nonviable enterprises along with 
the viable ones. In this scenario, if the intermediaries are free 
to behave as ordinary owners of capital, they will simply let the 
nonviable companies fail. However, if the government imposes 
a regulatory regime to avoid these mass failures, it will likely 
destroy the intermediaries' effectiveness as agents of genuine 
restructuring. For instance, by providing subsidies the state 
will signal to the intermediaries that the safest source of in- 
come lies not in the strenuous task of restructuring, but in 
extracting increasing amounts of money &om the state coffers. 
Thus, the state will be open to the opportunism of the financial 
institutions. 
However, this outcome may be avoided if the privatized 
enterprises are allocated to the intermediaries through an 
auction. A competitive bidding procedure will reveal the extent 
of the capital stock problems in advance of irrevocable deci- 
sions, thus allowing the state t o  determine how the resulting 
dislocations should be handled.g 
9. The design of an auction to be used in this context is a very complex 
matter which transcends the scope of this paper. For some of our suggestions, see 
Roman Frydman & Andrzej Rapaczynski, Evolution and Design in the East Europe- 
an fiamition FWVATIZATION PROCESSES IN E A ~ R N  EUROPE: THEORETICAL FOUN- 
DATIONS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS (Luigi Paganetto & Edmund Phelps eds., 81 
RMS-A DI P O ~ I C A  ECONOMICA 63, (1991)). 
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An auction offers many advantages as an allocative mecha- 
nism. First, potential managers of the intermediaries are likely 
to have varying skills: some may specialize in certain types of 
companies, others may have particular foreign business con- 
tacts, still others may be good a t  liquidating businesses and 
selling their assets. Under the auction system, each manager is 
able to tailor the selection of the companies in his fund's port- 
folio and the extent of the f i s  investment in any company to 
suit his expertise. This would be impossible in a mechanical 
allocatim of shares. By allowing such preferences to be reflect- 
ed in the ultimate allocation, the auction would thus properly 
match the skills of the individual fund managers with the 
needs of the economy. 
The second advantage of an auction is that it forces the 
managers of the intermediaries to seriously research the com- 
panies which will be privatized. If a list of such companies is 
announced a few months before the auction, every fund manag- 
er will know that his h ture  success depends to a large extent 
on the wisdom of his initial assessments. Therefore, each Eund 
manager will find out as much as possible about the enterpris- 
es, particularly those in which he may have some competitive 
advantage. As a result, a necessary precondition of genuine 
restructuring--the preparation of plans which will turn around 
the privatized enterprises--will begin in earnest immediately 
after the auction is announced. 
In other words, the inclusion of a well-designed auction in 
a privatization plan will immediately engage the private sector 
in a competitive process of information gathering, the results of 
which will also become available to the government. Unlike the 
endless enterprise valuations commissioned by the Eastern 
European states, the research here will be done by business- 
men and entrepreneurs who will be backing their estimates 
with investment decisions.1° While no valuation of post-Com- 
munist enterprises can be completely reliable (because the level 
of uncertainty is simply too high), these entrepreneurial esti- 
mates are probably the best possible. 
From the government's perspective, the most important 
10. Also, the valuations will be simpler because the prospective fund managers, 
looking to purchase the shares of the privatized enterprises with otherwise worth- 
less vouchers, will try to assess the enterprises' relative value (i.e., to rank them 
with respect to one another), rather than determine their monetary worth (which 
makes it necessary to compare them with all other potential investments). 
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information resulting from the auction will be the number of 
enterprises that the fund managers believe have no potential 
for recovery." This information will provide the government 
with a relatively good estimate of the extent of the worthless 
capital stock in the state sector. Since these worthless enter- 
prises will be left under state control, the state will be able to 
make the appropriate decisions as to their f d  disposition 
without risking a shock wave of plant-closings and unemploy- 
ment, and without compromising the restructuring of enterpris- 
es with potential. 
Confident that the intermediaries will consider their new 
acquisitions to be of value, the state can give the funds full 
responsibility for the companies in their portfolios and refuse to 
subsidize them in any way. The state can adopt a number of 
policies to deal with the companies in its possession, which will 
avoid destabilization and social unrest. The state may decide to 
pay off the debts of some of the enterprises and auction them 
again later, or it may give them to the workers. Another option 
would be to subsidize them temporarily in some other way and 
proceed with a staggered program of closures, so that the un- 
employed can gradually be absorbed by the newly developing 
private sector. The state could even put the "white elephants" 
into special liquidation funds, to be auctioned off to those who 
- would undertake to manage them for the lowest subsidies. In 
all of these cases, the good enterprises would be separated from 
the bad, and a continuation of some subsidies would not endan- 
ger the restructuring of the whole economy. 
2. The speed of privatization 
Much of the discussion regarding the speed a t  which East- 
ern European privatization should proceed is misguided. Those 
who say that the state should privatize everything immediately 
have no real appreciation of the political and social problems 
that might result from a sudden string of bankruptcies. Howev- 
er, the proponents of a more gradual process usually underesti- 
mate the difficulty that the restkcturing will encounter if the 
state remains in control for too long and new vested interests 
develop a hold over the process of privatization. 
11. If there is only one bidder for a given enterprise, a well-designed auction 
might give it to that bidder at no cost. Thus, if no one bids for an enterprise, it 
means everyone thinks it has negative value. 
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The answer to the question 'Wow fast?" needs to be more 
nuanced than "fast" or "slow." Those enterprises that are capa- 
ble of being privatized, i.e., those which are either viable in a 
competitive environment or could be profitably liquidated, 
should be privatized immediately. Those which are not viable 
and require a period of transition should be dealt with differ- 
ently, and not closed down overnight. The problem is how to 
distinguish the former from the latter. The solution is a well- 
designed auction system 8s a component of the privatization 
program. An auction will reveal important information at the 
outset of the reform process and allow for necessary subsequent 
modifications. 
B. Transaction Costs 
The problem with the capital stock in Eastern European 
economies has another, more complex, dimension which has not 
received proper attention. The very nature of the planned econ- 
omy contributed to the creation of links between enterprises. 
These links may make them incapable, or at  least much less 
capable, of functioning within a market economy. 
One of the fundamental features of a market economy is 
the considerable amount of duplication among firms in a given 
branch of production.12 Although this duplication of firms en- 
courages innovation and flexible responses to consumer de- 
mands, the central planner considered it wasteful and messy 
since it undermined his desire to simplify the center's chain of 
command. Moreover, a socialist enterprise never faced the 
possibility of losing the demand for its products since its "cus- 
tomers" were captives within the planned economy. Conse- 
quently, each firm in the command economy occupied a specific 
"niche," and there was very little incentive to organize f m s  as 
genuinely independent units. 
Therefore, unlike a market economy in which vertical inte- 
gration or other forms of common organization always have 
their cost in terms of diminished flexibility and the loss of 
alternative competitive sources of supply,13 the extent of inte- 
12. For the role of duplication in the capitalist economies, see RICHARD R. 
NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC HANGE 
(1982); Richard R. Nelson, Capitalism as an Engine of Progress (unpublished paper, 
on file with authors); and Richard R. Nelson, Why Do Firms Differ and How Does 
It Matter? (unpublished paper, on file with authors). 
13. For a discussion of the advantages and limits of vertical integration in the 
1 1 DFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE 11 
gration in a socialist economy is not limited by any factors 
beyond administrative convenience." Thus, each unit of pro- 
duction becomes rigidly fitted within the plan, and to the ex- 
tent the system provides incentives to produce more efficiently, 
individual units develop as many synergies as possible with 
their immediate suppliers and the recipients of their outputs. 
As a result, each unit invests very heavily in "niche specific" 
assets. This asset specificity makes i t  very difficult for the firm 
to function in another environment. 
If this analysis is correct, the transition to a market econo- 
my may entail staggering costs. In fact, if privatization sepa- 
rates the purely administrative units of the Communist econo- 
my and forces them to sink or swim on their own, the 
economy's initial performance may deteriorate to even lower 
levels. The new companies would be hard pressed to fmd new 
markets for their very specific goods. Additionally, they would 
naturally tend to  continue their old associations with their 
partners in the socialist chain of production. However, in addi- 
tion to resisting genuine transformation, they would now try to 
renegotiate the terms of their old relationships in order to gain 
as many advantages as possible under the new circumstances. 
The transaction costs of these negotiations would be high. In 
fact, as the f m s  attempt to exploit their mutual dependence, 
the cooperation among the old partners would likely be less 
smooth and more wasteful than ever. 
A partial solution to these problems may be provided by a 
proper mechanism for allocating the privatized companies to 
the intermediaries. A well-designed privatization auction can 
reduce the problems that would arise from enterprises taking 
advantage of their "niches." An auction allows the intermediar- 
ies to choose the companies in their portfolios. Therefore, the 
intermediaries can acquire interests in companies with special 
capitalist economies, see OLIVE% E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: 
ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); and OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, TIXI?, 
ECONOMIC I N ~ O N S  OF CAPITALISM (1985). For an alternative approach to the 
same issues, see Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Costs and Benefits of 
Ozunership: A A o r y  of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J .  POL. ECON. 691-719 
(1986). 
14. For an analysis of the theory of the firm in a centrally planned economy, 
see J6zef Zieleniec, Microeconomic Categories in Different Economic System: The 
F i n ,  in OPI'IMAL DECISIONS IN lhhRKEm AND PLANNED ECONOMIES 1 (Richard E. 
Quandt & Dugan T1ciska eds., 1990). For a claim that one could talk about the 
whole command economy as a single firm, see P.J.D. WILES, ECONOMIC INSTITU- 
TIONS COMPARED 39 (1984). 
links to one another and prevent these companies from exploit- 
ing each other. To the extent that these links are genuinely 
efficient, common ownership will protect and improve them, 
sometimes to the point of full-fledged mergers. If, however, 
these links have no beneficial long-term effect, the common 
owners will ensure that the firms are weaned from one another 
and that they develop relations with new customers and suppli- 
ers. However, this weaning will be gradual, and the exploit- 
ative opportunities will be accordingly diminished. In this con- 
text, the auction does not serve to reveal information, but rath- 
er to trigger a selfcorrection mechanism. 
C. Financial Infrastructure 
One of the main obstacles to further development of the 
post-Communist economies is the absence of a genuine banking 
system and the necessary capital markets. Since it may be 
diffcult to create these institutions quickly, financing the de- 
velopment of the post-Communist economies is bound to be 
problematic. This problem also bears on the choice of a privat- 
ization strategy. 
Banking reform in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland 
and Czechoslovakia, is in its infancy. Until recently, banking 
was completely centralized, with commercial banking being 
handled by the central bank. The central bank was merely an 
instrument of state planning and control, and its importance 
grew as other central planning institutions relinquished some 
of their direct power over the enterprises. In its expanding 
capacity, the central bank, through its local branches, was 
supposed to ensure that the enterprises maintained the balance 
among investment, wages, and working capital that the state 
considered desirable. 
Post-Communist reforms in Poland and Czechoslovakia 
divided the central banks into a number of independent institu- 
tions and attempted to introduce some commercial realism into 
enterprise financing. However, in practice, reforming the banks 
has not produced a significantly more rational system. Even 
now, large state enterprises of dubious viability can obtain 
signdicant amounts of credit (with which they continue to 
maintain high levels of employment and postpone radical man- 
agerial changes), while the new private sector, with its very 
thin capitalization, is unable to obtain affordable financing. It 
seems quite likely that without the entry of a s i w c a n t  for- 
eign component in the banking area, the reform of the financial 
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infrastructure of the Eastern European economies will be seri- 
ously retarded. 
In this connection, one of the most promising but contro- 
versial features of mass privatization plans which involve inter- 
mediaries is the intermediaries' potential to finesse the existing 
banking system and provide the germ of a new fmancial order. 
Privatization strategies involving intermediaries are often criti- 
cized for the high transaction costs they generate. In these 
plans, many individuals (perhaps every citizen) must receive 
notice of their new entitlement and an explanation of how the 
system works. In addition, the funds themselves must be set up 
and managed, which requires the establishment of a separate 
account for each of the participants. Since each participant's 
share may be of small value, administrative costs might con- 
sume a large portion of the proceeds. 
Governments are therefore looking to reduce the adminis- 
trative costs of the new order, perhaps by "piggybacking" their 
mass privatization schemes on existing mechanisms, such as 
social security registration. However, it might be worth incur- 
ring the somewhat higher initial transaction costs of certain 
proposals in order to lay the foundations for new financial 
institutions. Since the intermediaries would have to open and 
maintain individual accounts for a very large number of people, 
i t  might require very limited additional expense to link these 
activities with other types of services usually associated with 
consumer banking. 
Similarly, the intermediaries' restructuring role has close 
affinities with brokerage, commercial, investment, and mer- 
chant banking operations, as well as with insurance. The funds 
could thus provide the following services: lenders or agents in 
borrowing (arranging loans or floating commercial paper on 
foreign financial markets), agents in the sale of stocks or as- 
sets, and representatives (and perhaps financiers) in arranging 
joint ventures with foreign investors, insurers, and capital 
pools for channelling small savings into the growing economy of 
a country with a shortage of capital. 
In other words, the intermediaries could develop into ''uni- 
versal banks," similar to those in Germany or Japan. Given 
their flexibility, such institutions would be an attractive pros- 
pect for Eastern Europe. However, their development would 
also raise concerns regarding the influence such fmancial gi- 
ants could exercise on the fledgling political systems of Eastern 
Europe. Therefore, any decision to move in this direction 
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should be made carefully. If such a financial infrastructure is 
adopted, a system of safeguards should be implemented in ad- 
vance to limit inappropriate iduences. 
D. The Role of Government 
The quality of the civil service is another factor limiting 
the scope of successful reforms. The old bureaucrats were ap- 
pointed based on their political reliability and lack of personal 
independence. The new governments have started to replace 
the old personnel, but the process is slow, and the new people 
are often without much experience, especially when the re- 
quired expertise involves familiarity with business transac- 
tions. Consequently, it should not be surprising that civil ser- 
vice in Eastern Europe will need as much painstaking and time 
consuming rejuvenation as industry and the service sector. Fur- 
thermore, even in those areas in which government policy in 
the more stable countries of the West may successfully com- 
plement the market, there is serious doubt that the Eastern 
European bureaucracies could be trusted to achieve similar 
results. Therefore, privatization proposals must be evaluated 
with the idea of economizing on governmental expertise. 
No easy substitute for governmental regulation exists 
which can provide a clear set of the "rules of the game." Yet, 
the very idea of the intermediaries is to remove the state as 
much and as soon as  possible from managerial decisions, espe- 
. cially from the management of the privatization process itself. 
Thus, the intermediaries can be charged with such matters as 
selling and liquidating state enterprises and managing the 
government holdings. 
This idea of "privatizing privatization" is particularly im- 
portant given the low quality of government services in Eastern 
Europe. And yet, perhaps because many economists are not 
accustomed to  thinking about political actors in terms as so- 
phisticated as those they use with respect to economic agents, 
many privatization proposals ignore or minimize the limita- 
tions of the available governmental machine. 
VI. THE MAIN DANGER IN MASS PRNATIZATION 
PROPOSALS 
The intermediaries created during a mass privatization 
plan of the type considered here are potentially very powerful 
and influential institutions. Their power, like all power, could 
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easily be abused. Thus, it is important to curb this power by 
carefully attending to the incentives that the fund managers 
will have in the still largely unknown environment of the fu- 
ture Eastern European economies. 
The intermediaries' managers face a basic choice of strate- 
gy: whether to  position their funds as primarily economic or as 
primarily political agents. The first strategy is to prevail over 
one's competitors in restructuring to enhance the value of the 
privatized companies and to profit from their expansion. The 
second strategy is to collude with the other funds, to divide the 
markets by mutual agreements, and to  increase revenues by 
fxing prices, extracting rents from public officials, and en- 
trenching a complex system of state subsidies. This second 
alternative is the greatest danger posed by the mass privatiza- 
tion programs. 
All mass privatization proposals that include intermediar- 
ies involve this danger. Competition and restructuring is ardu- 
ous and fraught with perils and uncertainties for the manager 
who undertakes it. Genuine restructuring also means that the 
fund will encounter considerable hostility &om those who are 
dislodged from positions of influence and control. Therefore, it 
is quite likely that an alliance of disgruntled special interests 
will attempt to use available channels of political influence to 
produce a new wave of state interventionism in Eastern Eu- 
rope. The ability of the fund managers to resist these political 
pressures may be limited by their foreign connections and by 
the xenophobic attitudes present in all Eastern European soci- 
eties. The charge of selling out to foreigners has the ability to 
destroy an intermediary's truly competitive strategy. 
In contrast, to be a monopolist and a rent seeker can be 
extremely attractive to a fund manager. Eastern Europe has a 
long tradition of government paternalism, and forty years of 
communism have only advanced this philosophy. In addition, 
there are innumerable ways in which fund managers may asso- 
ciate the government with their own performance and shift to 
it some responsibility for their own failures. The intermediaries 
will have considerable resources at their disposal, while the 
governments will be temporarily ill-equipped to r e d a t e  the 
system. Thus, the funds may find it easy to manipulate the 
governmental agencies responsible for their regulation. Tariffs, 
subsidies, monopolies, and other evils would surely follow. 
Once entrenched, a system of this kind would be very dacult 
to  eradicate. 
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VII. THE GOVERNANCE OF THE INTERMEDIARIES AND 
THEIR ENVIRONMENT 
There are many ways in which reformers can attempt to 
prevent the fund managers from degenerating into rent-seek- 
ers; indeed, most of the program design questions concern this 
issue in one way or another. This section discusses some of the 
main concerns. 
A. Internal Governance 
The corporate governance structure of the intermediaries 
will play an important role in determining their behavior. The 
intermediaries are likely to be organized as domestic companies 
in the countries in which they will operate. Since foreign man- 
agers will probably dominate these companies, the authorities 
might try to make the fund's manager responsible to a board of 
directors representing local interests. Unfortunatdy, the real 
owners of the intermediaries, the shareholders, cannot be ex- 
pected to exercise their powers directly. Each fund might be 
owned by millions of people who will face insuperable collective 
action problems in trying to control the funds they own. Indeed, 
the very inability of the funds' owners to be actively involved in 
monitoring their property is responsible for the existence of the 
intermediaries in the first place. 
1. Boards of directors 
If the intermediaries' shareholders cannot be expected to 
monitor their performance, it might be difficult to find an ap- 
propriate substitute for them on the funds' boards of directors. 
For example, the reformers may be tempted to advocate politi- 
cal appointments to the intermediaries' boards of directors. 
This would ensure that the board would be more responsive to 
special interests than to the interests of the shareholders. 
Therefore, the best corporate governance structure is one in 
which the directors "represent" no one in a strict sense, but 
have a personal interest themselves in monitoring managerial 
performance. The idea of "independent directors," used in the 
United States, seems appropriate. 
The role of the board of directors is also a matter of more 
general concern. If the intermediaries are to be genuinely en- 
trepreneurial, business-oriented institutions, their manage- 
ment, chosen for its experience and foreign contacts, must be 
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primarily responsible for the policies of the fund. The board of 
directors should be a reactive body, guarding the interests of 
the shareholders against managerial abuses. If, on the other 
hand, the board's role is viewed as more active with respect to 
policy formulation and interferes with what are essentially 
business decisions, the board is likely to decrease the funds' 
effectiveness and to inject into its objectives a number of spe- 
cial-interest aims, unrelated to the maximization of returns on 
investment. 
2. Compensation 
The design of the intermediaries' compensation structure is 
another crucial aspect of the properly competitive character of 
their activities. A compensation system is extremely difficult to 
devise, especially in the absence of financial markets which 
would help determine the value of the assets under the 
intermediaries' management and thus also allow for a proper 
evaluation of their performance. However, the tying, even 
though imperfect, of the fund managers' compensation to their 
performance is a fundamental feature of every healthy incen- 
tive structure.15 
It is also important to determine the extent to which the 
state should regulate the fund managers' compensation. While 
it is quite clear that the state should regulate the compensation 
structure (so as to  ensure a proper set of incentives), the regu- 
lation of the compensation size (by, say, fixing it at a certain 
specific percentage of the funds' assets or of some other 
benchmark values) should, if possible, be left to the market. 
Not only will this increase competitive pressures, but i t  will 
also avoid signifkant mistakes. For example, if the state sets 
the amount, rather than the type, of ~o&~ensation, it is ex- 
tremely unlikely that i t  will get the numbers "right" (i.e., so 
that only transfer earnings and no rents are included). Further- 
more, if the state sets the amount of compensation too low, the 
appropriate actors &ll not enter, and if the compensation is set 
too high, the h d s  will derive unnecessary superprofits (rents). 
15. Making the compensation in part dependent on the value of the 
intermediaries' own shares m y  introduce a dose of competition for clients on 
whose behalf the funds manage the privatized companies. 
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B. The Intermediaries and the State 
One of the surest ways to convert the intermediaries into 
essentially bureaucratic institutions is to  associate their activi- 
ties with those of the state, and to make them dependent on 
the state for their existence and functioning. Foreseeable conse- 
quences of such an arrangement include the following: a dra- 
matic reduction in the fund's readiness to make decisions on 
the basis of ordinary business principles, the fund's reluctance 
to take risks, and above all, the fund's security in the assur- 
ance that the state, closely identified with the intermediaries in 
the minds of the public, would have to come to their aid if ei- 
ther they or the companies in which they were heavily invested 
were ever in financial jeopardy. 
1. Control of entry 
The way the intermediaries are formed is a decisive factor 
in determining their relation to the state. If the state creates 
funds (as would be the case, for example, if the state were to 
determine their number and composition), the state will be 
associated with their success or failure from the very begin- 
ning. Knowing this, the funds may exploit the state's vulnera- 
bility and extract concessions by threatening to produce eco- 
nomic effects which the authorities would find difficult to coun- 
ter. However, if the intermediaries' entry is essentially free (as 
would be the case, for example, if anyone satisfging some mini- 
mum regulatory conditions could create an intermediary), both 
the intermediaries' rent-seeking behavior and the degree of the 
state's association with the intermediaries would be reduced. 
2. Regulatory structure 
The state regulations covering the intermediaries will also 
play an important role. Some regulatory scheme must exist to 
protect the shareholders from managerial overreaching and to 
control self-dealing, insider trading, and other corrupt practic- 
es. But this same scheme might also put bureaucrats firmly in 
control and force the funds to concentrate more on capturing 
the bureaucracy than on the restructuring process itself. To 
minimize bureaucratic interference, it might be safer to rely 
more on disclosure requirements than on complex approval 
procedures and outright prohibitions. Also, the reformers may 
want to structure the monitoring agencies as basically prosecu- 
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torial, with the courts serving as the ultimate enforcers, rather 
than creating powerfid rulemaking bodies which might be more 
intrusive and easier to capture. 
3. State ownership 
Many privatization proposals envisage the states retaining 
a substantial portion of the shares of the privatized companies 
for budgetary and other reasons. However, to the extent that 
the state remains a serious player as a partial owner of the 
companies in the intermediaries' portfolios, political behavior 
by the intermediaries remains a dangerously attractive option. 
C. The Relation to the S m l l  Investor 
The main question regarding small investors is whether 
they later would choose the intermediaries in which they invest 
or whether they would automatically receive a certain number 
of various intermediaries. 
1. Consllmer choice and free entry 
There are advantages to not giving the beneficiaries, at 
least initially, the right to choose the intermediaries which they 
are going to own. The reasons for these restrictions are always 
the same: administrative simplicity, which eliminates transac- 
tion costs involved in other solutions, and the informational 
barriers facing small investors which would limit their ability 
to avail themselves of the benefits of choice. 
A decision to  restrict consumer choice in these matters, 
however, has very serious costs. Without consumer choice, the 
state must allocate the shares, and there is no opportunity for 
free entry of the intermediaries. 
The only practical way of assuring the free entry of the 
intermediaries (subject to the fulfillment of some minimum 
qualification requirements) is to distribute privatization vouch- 
ers. The funds would then use these vouchers to acquire the 
shares of the privatized enterprises. However, if the consumer 
is given no control over the choice of intermediaries in which 
he will "invest", the entry of the intermediaries must be a func- 
tion of a state decision. This will make the state seem responsi- 
ble for allowing some institutions to enter. Such a certification 
might make it very difficult for the state to avoid the blame if 
some of the funds do not perform well in the future. The very 
awareness of this might make the state regulate the funds 
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more intrusively, and the fund managers will be more likely to 
rely on subsidies than entrepreneurial success. 
2. Limiting the class of beneficiaries 
Given the importance of the free entry which is precluded 
by an administrative allocation of the shares to the population, 
it might be better to  look for other ways to reduce the transac- 
tion costs of the allocation. Perhaps the best solution is to place 
a limit on the number of beneficiaries (as is planned in the 
Czechoslovakian version of this program) by making the recipi- 
ents pay a relatively small amount of money for the vouchers 
to be distributed.16 In addition to reducing transaction costs, 
this solution may also make it possible to achieve a much high- 
er level of interest among the b d s '  shareholders, a higher 
level of information, and perhaps even a sufficient concentra- 
tion of holdings for more active shareholder involvement in the 
governance of the funds. Finally, the smaller number of share- 
holders (each of whom would invest in a fund of his or her own 
choice) would allow each fund to develop more extensive rela- 
tions with its shareholders. For example, the funds may pro- 
vide other financial and banking services which may contribute 
to the development of the badly needed modern banking sector. 
D. Portfolio Allocation 
This paper has already discussed ways in which the meth- 
od of allocating the privatized companies to the intermediaries 
might affect the success or failure of the mass privatization 
plans. In addition to  these considerations, allocation method 
will also affect whether the funds will be primarily political or 
economic agents. If the allocation is administrative, the inter- 
mediaries are likely to focus from the outset on political influ- 
ence. If the allocation is mechanical, with secondary trading 
relied upon to  differentiate the portfolios at a later stage, the 
cash-strapped funds are likely to enter into collusive agree- 
ments to redistribute their portfolios, rather than compete with 
one another in lengthy trade-offs in an extremely thin market, 
involving perhaps a total of ten participants. In both cases, the 
state will associate its own prestige and responsibility with the 
type of assets in each fund, again opening the possibility for 
16. The size of the payment could be adjusted to arrive at the "right" number 
of shareholders for each fund. 
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future exploitation by the funds. If, however, the allocation 
proceeds through an auction, from the outset there will be more 
competition and less collusion. 
E. The Relation to Foreign Financial 
Institutions 
Most commentators note the crucial importance of the 
entry of foreign capital and expertise into Eastern Europe. For 
a number of reasons, the entry of foreigners in their capacity as 
investors presents serious political problems, while their entry 
as advisers is of very little use. 
However, the entry of foreign financial institutions in con- 
nection with the setting up and running of the intermediaries 
in the privatization program is particularly appropriate for 
three reasons. First, foreign expertise may be critical in estab- 
lishing the infrastructure of a modern capitalist economy since 
the Eastern Europeans have practically no experience at all. 
Second, this infrastructure is particularly important because its 
presence liberates market forces, facilitating a chain reaction of 
growth and development. Third, the foreigners will initially be 
entering here primarily as managers of the funds, working on 
behalf of the local owners of the underlying assets, rather than 
as buyers of East European industry (although some part of 
their compensation may, and should, include stock options). 
Since the foreigners' success would directly increase the value 
of equity in local hands, their presence might be more accept- 
able than under other circumstances. Moreover, if the relations 
between the funds and their shareholders are structured in 
such a way that the assets under the intermediaries' manage- 
ment are directly proportional to the number of local citizens 
who choose that h d ,  the degree of foreign influence could be 
seen as exactly proportional to the welcome of the local popula- 
tion. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
As the reform process in Eastern Europe unfolds, it is 
becoming more apparent that price liberalization alone will be 
insufficient, and that privatization is crucial. Furthermore, 
spontaneous developments alone cannot be relied upon. A care- 
ful design is necessary to anticipate the aggregate effects of 
mass privatization programs in economies with virtually no 
reliable information regarding the state of their capital stock 
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and with no developed financial institutions to support a mar- 
ket economy. 
However, the dearth of important information also means 
that all designs involve serious risks of highly negative econom- 
ic and political consequences. Therefore, only a proper combina- 
tion of design and reliance on market mechanisms will allow 
for a successful transition. The role of the market mechanisms 
is particularly important in revealing the lacking information 
and reducing the levels of uncertainty. These market mecha- 
nisms can also help avoid the dangers inherent in administra- 
tive and bureaucratic solutions and permit the creation of spe- 
cially designed institutional "checks and balances" and other 
self-correcting mechanisms in the privatization design. 
